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Abstract:  
Xiaokai Yang's theory of economic specialization under increasing returns to scale is 
a formal development of the fundamental Smith-Young theorem on the extent of the 
market and the social division of labor. In this theory specialization-and, thus, the 
social division of labor-is firmly embedded within a system of perfectly competitive 
markets. This leaves unresolved whether and how such development processes are 
possible in economies based on more primitive, non-market organizations. 
In this paper we discuss a general relational model of economic interaction. 
Within this non-market environment we discuss the emergence of economic 
specialization and eventually of economic trade and a social division of labor. We 
base our approach on three levels in organizational development: the presence of a 
stable relational structure; the presence of relational trust and subjective 
specialization; and, finally, the emergence of objective specialization through the 
institution and the social recognition of economic roles. 
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2 
1 Introduction 
 
Xiaokai Yang visited the Center for Economic Research at Tilburg University during the 
spring of 1999. Immediately he engaged two of the three authors in extensive discussions on 
his research program. We easily identified similar research interests and this led to some 
fruitful exchanges and discussions. 
During Professor Yang's visit to Tilburg we in particular discussed working paper 
versions of papers that were published subsequently as Diamantaras, Gilles and Ruys (2003), 
and Sun, Yang, and Zhou (2004). These papers address some of the central problems and 
theoretical questions that lie at the intersection of our respective research programs. It is 
therefore fitting that in this paper we return to these central questions and sketch a new theory 
of the emergence of a social division of labor in a non-market economy. 
The research program of Professor Yang was seminally developed in Yang (1988) and 
subsequently brought to fruition in numerous research papers1. The core of this research 
program is the application of inframarginal analysis to the decision model of an individual 
consumer-producer within a system of perfectly competitive markets. Yang’s inframarginal 
approach is in turn used to model the Smith-Young approach to the relationship of speciali-
zation, the social division of labor, and increasing returns to scale, in line with Smith (1776), 
Young (1928), and Stigler (1951). 
Smith (1776) argued in his seminal work The Wealth of Nations that the social 
division of labor is limited by the extent of the market, so that the benefits of specialization to 
an individual are determined largely by the existing social division of labor in the economy. 
This is also known as the Smithian Theorem. Young (1928) extended the Smithian Theorem 
into a synergetic argument that the extent of the market also depends on the level of social 
division of labor. Thus, the presence of increasing returns leads to specialization and further 
social division of labor. In turn, a high level of social division of labor within a system of 
competitive markets leads to the deepening of increasing returns to scale and eventually to 
increasing economies of specialization. These developments form further incentives to 
specialize and to develop the social division of labor. 
In the present paper we intend to sketch an argument that extends the Smithian 
theorem beyond the setting of a economy based on a system of perfectly competitive markets. 
Our argument is that the Smith–Young mechanism also applies to social organizations and 
institutional settings other than that of a system of perfectly competitive markets. In 
particular, we develop a theory based on value generating binary relationships – or 
“matchings” – that describe the relational foundation of all economic interaction. This 
describes a primitive economy in which markets at best exist in their most primitive form, 
namely as a network of binary exchange relations; thus, without necessarily the presence of a 
single price that determines the terms of trade in marketable exchange relationships. 
We conclude from our analysis that the process of specialization occurs at different 
levels of embeddedness of the individual consumer–producer within the relational structure of 
the economy. Only at its most advanced state – namely that of objective specialization – this 
process results into a social division of labor. A social division of labor thus generates 
                                               
1
 We refer to Yang (2001), Yang (2003), and Cheng and Yang (2004) for a comprehensive review of the work 
that has been accomplished in this research program. 
  
 
 
 
 
 
3 
economic development and growth in the context of more primitive economic institutions and 
exchange mechanisms. This leads to the conclusion that a social division of labor can emerge 
independently from a system of perfectly competitive markets. The Smith-Young mechanism 
is in fact founded on more fundamental forces within the economy. Hence, economic 
development is not based on the endogenous selection of a specialization by an individual 
based on the prevailing market prices; instead, it is the institutionalization of a pair of 
complementary social economic roles – from which the individual selects one – that generates 
growth. Each role corresponds to some objectively defined specialization of that individual. 
For a detailed development of the mathematical model we refer to Gilles, Lazarova and Ruys 
(2006) on which the current paper is based.  
In their seminal contribution, Yang and Borland (1991) already have shown 
theoretically that the Smith-Young mechanism functions as a determining factor for economic 
growth. Indeed, the mechanism of ever-deepening economic specialization and the 
accompanying development of the social division of labor lead to significant growth. In 
economic history and the new institutional economics this has been accepted as the main 
engine behind the rise of the western economies.2  
Recently, Acemoglu et al. (2005) have confirmed Yang and Borland’s theoretical 
conjecture through empirical observations and analysis. Furthermore, Ogilvie (2004) and 
Greif (2006) have extended this institutional growth argument and pointed to economic 
organizations other than the perfectly competitive market in which the Smith-Young 
mechanism causes economic development and growth. Acemoglu et al. (2005) mainly point 
to the development of property rights and the underlying political institutions as causes of 
economic growth, while Ogilvie (2004) investigates the development of medieval and early-
modern guild systems. Empirical evidence of past performance of western economies backs 
up these arguments. Our theoretical contribution fits with this line of research. 
In Section 2 we develop our model of a matching economy based on binary value-
generating activities among economic agents. We also discuss subjective specialization and 
the possibility of subjective stability through means of an existence result. In Section 3 we 
define generic stability as our main equilibrium notion and present our main existence result. 
This result identifies the possibility of objective specialization, which in turn implies the 
emergence of a social division of labor in such a matching economy. We summarize and 
extend our main line of thought in Section 4. 
 
2 Trust and stability 
 
As mentioned above, in the current paper we discuss a model of a rather primitive economy in 
which economic agents directly interact with one other without reference to a central 
organization such as a system of competitive markets or a unified price mechanism. Instead 
individual economic agents engage in binary, value-generating relationships or “matchings”. 
These matchings have to be understood as binary productive engagements, which are not 
necessarily trade relationships. It is assumed in this very primitive economy that every 
individual activates exactly one value-generating matching. 
                                               
2
 See, e.g., North and Thomas (1973), North (1990), Greif (1994), and North (2005). 
  
 
 
 
 
 
4 
Our main argument is that there are two different forms of stability possible within such a 
matching economy. 
 
• Subjective stability: Individuals engage in binary, value-generating relationships-so-
called matchings-and stability is attained if individuals are not willing to either break all 
of their engagements and become autarkic or switch partners for higher benefits. Thus, 
there results a stable matching pattern based on the local properties of these binary 
engagements. In other words, the presence of stability is “subjective” in the sense that it is 
completely based on the properties of the productive abilities and utility functions of the 
individuals in the economy.  
We show that the presence of stable matching patterns is guaranteed in case a special 
substructure of potential relationships has a bipartite structure. The existence of subject-
tively stable matching patterns is the subject of our first existence theorem. 
If a state of subjective stability is attained, individuals might develop mutually beneficial 
trade within the relationship that they are engaged in. Subsequently, after beneficial trade 
has been established, the engaged individuals might specialize their productive activities. 
This specialization occurs only within the (subjective) setting of the matching that they are 
engaged in. We call this subjective specialization.  
We emphasize that subjective specialization does not induce a social division of labor 
since individuals are not engaged at a higher social plane; their economic interaction is 
explicitly limited to be confined to their matchings only. In that regard the organization of 
the economy remains scattered and there is no unified social organization of the economy. 
As a consequence, there are no widespread gains from trade. There are only locally 
generated gains from trade. 
 
• Generic stability: Only if generic stability is possible, economic agents can truly 
specialize in an objective fashion and there emerges a social division of labor. A matching 
economy attains generic stability if for every profile of utility functions and production 
sets, there exists a stable matching pattern. Our main existence theorem states that such 
generic stability is attained if and only if there is a social organization of the economy 
based on at least two socially recognized economic roles. Hence, there should exist at 
least two complementary socio-economic roles such that value-generating relationships 
solely exist between individuals with different socio-economic roles. Only after such 
complementary socio-economic roles are established, a true endogenous social division of 
labor can emerge in which individuals specialize in these roles. In turn, this implies that a 
social organization of the economy emerges and that widespread gains from trade become 
attainable. 
Our main existence theorem on generic stability thus identifies that a bipartite social 
division of labor is a pre-requisite for stability. This amends the Smithian theorem in the 
sense that there has to exist a finite set of socio-economic roles into which individuals can 
specialize, to establish stability in the social organization of the economy. The emergence 
of a set of socially recognized socio-economic roles is, thus, a necessary condition for true 
generic stability in the economy.  
Since economic prosperity is determined largely by the set of available complementary 
socio-economic roles, the Smith-Young mechanism of economic development is now 
linked to the development of this set of socially recognized roles; innovation in social 
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organization–in the sense that new social roles are developed–now determines the extent 
of the market and, thus, economic growth. 
 
Although our model of a matching economy describes a very primitive society, we believe 
that it makes possible some rather deep conclusions. Our approach also makes explicit again 
the indeterminacy problem identified by Gilles and Diamantaras (2005). They argued that the 
theory of the Smith-Young development mechanism within the context of a well-developed 
system of perfectly competitive markets is founded on a circular argument: prices of traded 
goods determine individuals’ specialization and, thus, prices determine the social division of 
labor. This, in turn, determines which goods are produced and traded, determining the extent 
of the market. This brings up the question who or what ultimately determines which goods are 
traded and how economic development is accomplished. In other words, this development 
mechanism has no origin or starting point. Gilles and Diamantaras concluded that the 
determinacy problem has to be resolved in order to make further progress on the analysis of 
economic development processes. Our goal in our analysis is to show that stability is required 
for any specialization of individuals in an economy and that a social division of labor only 
emerges in a society that has a stable organizational structure based on objectively given 
socio-economic roles. In this section we discuss the first part of this argument. We introduce a 
very generic model of a society in which individuals can engage into binary economic 
interactions. We define two stability concepts in such a relational economy and determine 
when stability is attainable. 
In our approach we put in some sense this determinacy problem at the center of our 
analysis. Indeed, our main result states that generic stability requires the existence of a certain 
set of established social roles from which individuals can choose when they specialize. Each 
socio-economic role stands for a certain commonly recognized economic specialization and in 
equilibrium the number of agents of each role is balanced.3 Only then an effective social 
division of labor emerges and the society can engage into an effective process of economic 
development and growth. Ultimately, economic development is thus founded on the 
enhancement and extension of the socially determined set of accepted economic roles. 
We conclude that economic development and growth is caused by organizational and 
institutional change rather than technical change only.4 We argue that technical change is a 
consequence and expression of the effectiveness of the social organization of the economy. 
2.1 Matching economies and stable matching patterns 
 
Formally, we denote by N = {1,...,n} a finite set of individuals. At this stage we do not make 
any assumptions about these individuals regarding their individual abilities. Hence, at this 
stage we do not explicitly assume that these individuals are even able to specialize in any 
form. Instead we endow these individuals with the abilities to engage into relational economic 
activities that generate economic values or wealth.5 We refer to these binary interactions as 
                                               
3
 For the latter argument we refer to Yang’s theory of general equilibrium under endogenous specialization. 
Explicitly we refer to Yang (2001) for a detailed discussion and treatment of this argument. 
4
 We refer again to Acemoglu et al. (2005) for a complete discussion of this point of view. 
5
 The most primitive form of a matching is that of cooperation in some production activities. More advanced 
forms include the simple exchange or trade of two commodities. The gains from trade then form the values that 
are generated between the two traders. 
  
 
 
 
 
 
6 
value-generating (economic) relational activities. Thus, individuals are assumed to have 
relational economic abilities. We do not exclude that these relational abilities in turn might be 
based on individual abilities. We do not assume or impose that these value-generating 
relational activities take place in the context of a market. Instead we assume that these 
relational abilities describe the economy itself. 
Formally, we define },|{ Njiij ∈⊂Γ  as a set of potential relational activities 
between the individuals in N. Here, for two distinct individuals Ni ∈  and Nj ∈  with ji ≠ , 
we define Γ∈ij  to mean that these individuals i and j are able to engage in a value-generating 
relational activity. We indicate this potential relational engagement Γ∈ij  as a potential 
matching of i and j.  
Furthermore, every individual Ni ∈  is endowed with complete and transitive 
preferences over her potential matchings { } Γ⊂∈Γ∈=Γ NjijLi )(  in which she can engage. 
These preferences can be represented by a hedonic utility function given by ℜ→Γ)(: ii Lu . 
Let ),...,( 1 nuuu =  denote a hedonic utility profile and U be the set of all hedonic profiles 
representing complete and transitive preferences. We summarize the developed primitive 
concepts into a unifying concept: 
 
Definition 1 
A matching economy is defined to be a triple ),,( uN Γ=Ε  in which N is a finite set of 
individuals, Γ  is a potential matching structure on N, and ∈u  Ủ is a hedonic utility profile 
on Γ . The pair ),( ΓN  consisting of the set of individuals endowed with all potential value-
generating relationships is also called the (relational) constitution of ),,( uN Γ=Ε . 
 
A matching economy is essentially based on potential binary activities that generate economic 
values. For example, a trade economy can be represented as a matching economy between 
buyers and sellers who can trade physical goods to generate gains from trade. Hence 
Γ represents the binary trade relations between such buyers and sellers. The gains from trade 
are exactly the hedonic utilities generated in these trade relationships, i.e., )(ijui  stands for the 
individual gains from trade of individual i as she engages in a mutually beneficial trade with 
individual j. 
 
Within the context of a matching economy we investigate the proper definition of stability. 
Stability refers to the presence of a pattern of activated matchings that is in a state of 
equilibrium. Stability is a necessary condition for the further development of an economy, in 
particular for the emergence of specialization and a social division of labor. 
Our main hypothesis in the definition of stability is that in a matching economy 
),,( uN Γ=Ε  each individual i activates exactly one of her potential matchings in )(ΓiL . This 
fundamental hypothesis is founded on the fact that we model a very primitive economy 
without the presence of advanced economic or social institutions. In such a primitive 
economy it is natural to assume that individuals only interact with a single other individual at 
a time and that more complex interactions require more advanced social institutions than 
assumed within our context. 
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Formally we introduce the notion of a matching pattern to describe a collection of 
activated binary value-generating relationships in Γ . 
 
Definition 2 
A matching pattern is a subset of the potential matching structure Γ⊂pi  such that every 
individual is either paired with exactly one other individual or remains relationally autarkic, 
i.e., Γ⊂pi is such that either 1|)(| =piiL  or pi∈ii , for all Ni ∈ . 
 
In a matching pattern one and only one matching is selected and executed by each individual. 
For ease of notation we denote the utility an individual i has when participating in a matching 
pattern pi  in which }{)( pipi iiLi = as )(piiu , i.e., )()( pipi iiuu ii ≡ , for all Ni ∈ . We emphasize 
that the hedonic utility profile considered here allows an individual to consider only one 
matching at a time, since we do not allow an individual to engage in multiple matchings at the 
same time. 
With the tools developed so far we are able to introduce two relational stability 
concepts. Again we let the matching economy ),,( uN Γ=Ε  be given throughout. For 
matching pattern Π∈pi , a potential matching pi\Γ∈ij  is a blocking matching if 
)()( piii uiju >  as well as )()( pijj uiju > . 
Having defined a blocking matching as a strict binary Pareto improvement, we follow 
the concepts used in the literature on matching (Roth and Sotomayor, 1990). We point out that 
our notion of stability is closely related to that of stability in network formation (Jackson and 
Wolinsky, 1996). With this concept we can define our stability property of a matching pattern. 
 
Definition 3 
A matching pattern Π∈pi  is stable in the economy ),,( uN Γ=Ε  if all matchings in pi  satisfy 
the individual rationality (IR) and the no blocking (NB) conditions: 
• IR )()( iiuu ii ≥pi  for all Ni ∈ , and 
• NB there is no blocking matching with regard to pi , that is, for all  Ni ∈ and Nj ∈ with 
ji ≠ and pi\Γ∈ij  it holds that )()( piii uiju >  implies that )()( pijj uiju ≤ . 
Stable matching patterns in E are denoted by *( , , )N upi ∈Π Γ . 
 
Condition (IR) is an individual rationality requirement, that states that an individual cannot be 
matched with another individual without her consent, i.e., if an individual is better-off under 
relational autarky, she will pursue that. 
Condition (NB) stands for a non-blocking condition requiring that a blocking 
matching does not exist with respect to matching pattern Π∈pi . Under (NB) if an individual 
prefers to be matched with an alternative individual than the one with whom he is matched 
under matching pattern pi , then that alternative individual does not agree to engage with him. 
This condition is closely related to the condition of link addition proofness in network 
formation. Link addition proofness is at the foundation of the notion of pairwise stability in 
network formation, seminally introduced by Jackson and Wolinsky (1996). 
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With reference to the definition of stable matching patterns, we note that in general 
these stable patterns might fail to exist. In particular, in the absence of such a stable matching 
pattern there emerges a state of permanent chaos or instability within a relational economy E. 
This essentially refers to a situation in which individuals permanently search for the most 
optimal partner to engage in a value-generating relationship. 
The main application of the general relational framework developed is here that of a 
relational economy of consumer-producers. We point to the new classical framework 
developed in Yang (2001) and Yang (2003). The new classical approach is firmly founded on 
the premise that consumer-producers specialize within a social context of a structure of 
(market) interactions and, thus, attain higher welfare levels. 
In Gilles et al. (2006) we start at an even more primitive level of reasoning. Before 
there is actual specialization, there are consumer-producers with simple skills on which these 
specializations can be based. We recognize that skills, unlike commodities, are intrinsic to a 
consumer-producer and cannot be exchanged. They can, however, be shared. Sharing one's 
skills with another individual is a process that does not make the giver any poorer in the skill.6 
As established by Yang and Borland (1991) and Yang (2003), learning-by-doing is an 
important mechanism in the process of growth. However, in Yang's framework this process is 
individual-specific, i.e., economic individuals are not allowed to learn from each other. In 
Gilles et al. (2006), we go beyond this restriction by allowing learning processes among 
engaged individuals. 
2.2 Existence of stability and subjective specialization 
 
In our previous discussion, we have focused mainly on a primitive economy with limited 
specialization. In such economies there might not emerge an equilibrium in the form of a 
stable matching pattern. (For an explicit example of such an economy we refer to Example 3.4 
in Gilles et al. (2006).) Here we investigate the sufficient conditions for the existence of such 
stable matching patterns. We also discuss the implications of our findings with regard to 
specialization in a relational economy. 
We first address the introduction of a particular sub-structure of the constitution of a 
matching economy. 
 
Definition 4 
A matching pattern Π∈pi  is weakly stable in the economy ),,( uN Γ=Ε  if all matchings in 
pi  satisfy the individual rationality (IR) and whenever a blocking matching pi\Γ∈ij  exists, 
at least one of the blocking partners in ij is relationally autarkic, i.e., { } ≠∩pijjii, ∅. 
Denote by Π⊂Π w  the collection of all weakly stable matching patterns. 
Finally, we define Γ⊂Π∪=Γ ww  to be the set of all potential weakly stable matchings. 
 
                                               
6
 A commodity, in comparison, if shared makes the giver poorer in the possession of that commodity. This is to 
say that while commodities are pure private goods, skills are non-rival in nature. 
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The definition introduces a sub-constitution ),( wN Γ  based on the class of weakly stable 
matching patterns. We refer to the sub-constitution ),( wN Γ  as the core-constitution of the 
matching economy ),,( uN Γ=Ε . 
For the formulation of our existence theorem we introduce some auxiliary concepts. 
Let Γ⊂Ω  be some collection of mutually beneficial relationships between individuals in N. 
The sub-constitution ),( ΩN is bipartite if there exists a partitioning { }21, NN  of the set of 
individuals N such that 
 
 { } { }NiiiNjandNiij ∈∪∈∈⊂Ω 21 . 
 
Hence, in a bipartite constitution of a relational economy, there are two socially recognized 
economic roles or “types” such that value-generating relationships only exist between 
individuals of different types. 
 
Existence theorem 1 
If a matching economy ),,( uN Γ=Ε  has a bipartite core-constitution ),( wN Γ , then it holds 
that ≠ΓΠ ),,(* uN ∅. 
 
The existence theorem stated above identifies a particular set of potential value-generating 
relationships that has to form a bipartite structure in order for stable matching patterns to be 
possible. Hence, certain vital or “constituting” relationships have to form a bipartite structure. 
This implies that there are essentially two groups of individuals between which these 
constituting relationships exist. We again refer to Gilles et al. (2006) for further discussion of 
this topic and its consequences. 
 
3 Specialization and stability 
 
In the previous section we have introduced various notions of stability – or equilibrium – and 
linked the existence of stable matching patterns to the bipartite nature of certain vital value-
generating relationships. In this section we link the existence of these stable matching patterns 
with the possibility of individual specialization. 
3.1 The emergence of exchange and subjective specialization 
 
Now assume that we have a matching economy E that satisfies the condition of Existence 
Theorem 1, i.e., the economy E has a bipartite core-constitution. In that case there emerges a 
state of subjective stability in the sense that there exists a stable matching pattern in the 
economy. We emphasize that subjective stability is fully based on the local conditions in the 
economy, i.e., the explicit abilities of the individuals in the economy rather than the generic, 
global conditions in the economy. 
If a subjectively stable state emerges in the economy, all individuals are engaged in 
stable value-generating relationships. Within the context of these relationships, a moderate 
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level of relational trust can be build up. If a sufficient high level of trust emerges, there first 
will come about commodity exchange between these individuals. Thus, the emergence of a 
level of moderate relational trust allows individuals to engage in mutually beneficial exchange 
of commodities. We emphasize that this commodity exchange is purely binary and, thus, 
scattered at best. Therefore, there is neither any market nor any global trade network 
emerging. 
After mutually beneficial commodity exchange has been established to enhance the 
value-generating relationships in which individuals are engaged, a further deepening of the 
level of relational trust will take place. After the relational trust has been enhanced, 
individuals will be trustworthy enough of their partner that they become willing to specialize 
their productive activities. We emphasize that this form of specialization is completely based 
on the local conditions in the economy, in particular the conditions in the relationship in 
which individuals are engaged. Indeed, if conditions are favorable, individuals might develop 
sufficient trust towards their partner such that they decide to specialize fully and exchange 
their necessary commodities with their like-wise fully specialized partner. This can be 
indicated as subjective specialization. 
Gilles et al. (2006) develop a detailed example in which these specialization processes 
are made explicit and higher levels of wealth or hedonic utility are achieved through 
specialization and binary exchange. Again we emphasize that under subjective specialization 
there does not emerge a global social organization in the form of a system of markets and a 
social division of labor. Instead individuals remain engaged in binary relationships guided by 
conditions in their immediate neighborhood, i.e., by local conditions in the economy only. 
3.2 The emergence of trade and objective specialization 
 
The previous discussion clarifies the emergence of stable matching patterns and of subjective 
specialization. This emergence is essentially based on localized conditions based on features 
within the subjectively stable pattern of stable matchings. For an economy to have persistent 
access to such gains from specialization, the social structure of the economy has to 
generically admit stable matchings. Hence, whatever capabilities and desires of the 
individuals-represented by their utility functions and (possibly) other individualistic features-a 
stable matching pattern has to exist in the matching economy. 
Technically, this brings up the question under which conditions on ),( ΓN there exists 
a stable matching pattern for every possible matching economy ),,( uN Γ=Ε , where u is an 
arbitrary utility profile. This line of research follows the research agenda set in the matching 
literature. Here we are able to apply the main result of Papai (2004). 
 
Definition 5 
A relational constitution ),( ΓN  is generically stable if for every utility profile Uu ∈ -and 
thus for every matching economy ),,( uN Γ=Ε  based on this relational constitution-it holds 
that ≠ΓΠ ),,(* uN ∅. 
 
Our main existence theorem can now be stated as follows: 
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Existence theorem 2 
The relational constitution ),( ΓN  is generically stable if and only if ),( ΓN  is bipartite. 
 
This second existence theorem provides a complete and powerful characterization of 
generically stable matching structures. This is a very strong result with some deep 
consequences. As stated before, certain sets of skill complementarities might result into the 
emergence of stable matching patterns. These stable matching patterns in turn give rise to 
subjective specialization and mutually beneficial exchange. This does not mean that there 
results widespread gains from trade. For such enhanced economic development it is necessary 
that there emerges an objective or socially recognized division of labor. 
In particular, the deepening of the stable matching patterns through subjective 
specialization in turn leads to the emergence of bipartite structures of potential matchings. 
This emergence is based on the social recognition of the roles that are based on the subjective 
specialization of individuals in such stable matching patterns. This is discussed next. 
In objective specialization each individual now expects to be trading when she 
engages in a matching. Also, under objective specialization, unlike under subjective 
specialization, the level of trust expands to the whole set of players, i.e., to the whole 
economy. This is why an individual believes fully that she can be matched with another 
player with whom exchange is beneficial in a stable matching. In fact, there is common 
knowledge that individuals with different socially recognized specializations can be matched 
in highly productive value-generating relationships. Individuals, who assume social roles, 
have socially justified beliefs that a stable matching pattern exists. 
At present we argue that further deepening of the efficiency in this economy is only 
possible through the establishment of a true social division of labor based on a set of socially 
recognized economic roles. For that purpose we consider a primitive society in which indiv-
iduals acquire two different productive skills, hunting skills and gathering skills. Assume that 
at first there emerges some stable matching pattern in which individuals exploit the comple-
mentarities of hunting and gathering. Within the context of this equilibrium, individuals now 
decide to become slightly specialized in hunting or gathering. If sufficient trust is developed 
among matched individuals, some individuals might specialize fully on hunting or gathering. 
This introduces subjective specialization into this primitive economy similar to the social 
developments discussed at the end of section 3.1. 
Subsequently, a deepening of this specialization might emerge. Indeed, if these sub-
jective specializations are recognized socially, individuals become a “hunter” or a “gatherer”. 
Being a hunter now becomes a socially recognized economic role, as does being a gatherer. 
This in turn implies that only after the establishment of such complementary social roles there 
emerges a social division of labor.7 The emergence of socially recognized economic roles and 
the accompanying social division of labor is now identified with the effects of full-blown 
economic specialization. This type of specialization is generic in the sense of Definition 5 
above; it can be referred to as objective specialization. 
It should be noted here that the emergence of trade between individuals with different 
social roles is fundamentally different from commodity exchange between subjectively 
                                               
7
 We emphasize here that the establishment of a social role requires the social recognition of each role and the 
separation of the related specialism from each individual. Thus, the social recognition of an economic role 
induces a dichotomy of this role and other aspects of her life for every individual that assumes this role. 
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specialized individuals. Social recognition indeed alleviates the informational burden and 
implements certain expectations. 
Finally, we can in fact identify conditions under which a competitive market can 
emerge. If sufficiently large number of individuals assume the social roles of hunter and 
gatherer and other economic institutions such as the protection of property rights, monetary 
instruments, and the creation of actual market places are established, then there might emerge 
a market at which hunters and gatherers can trade vegetables and meat for a well established 
and unique market price. 
Objective specialization excludes relationships between individuals with the same 
social role as being potentially beneficial economic matchings. This implicitly reduces the 
potential matching structure to an odd acyclic or bipartite structure in which only matchings 
between individuals with two different roles are recognized. 
 
4 From chaos to generic stability and market systems 
 
In this paper we introduced a four-stage approach to the emergence of a social division of 
labor based on the objective specialization of individuals. As a fifth stage we can add the 
emergence of market institutions themselves. This approach clarifies that the presence of a 
social division of labor is in fact a prerequisite for the creation or emergence of a functioning 
price mechanism. Summarizing these four stages are: 
Stage I: Chaos (non-equilibrium). In a primitive relational economy without 
objective specialization, there usually are conditions that do not support an 
equilibrium. This leads to a situation in which all individuals are fully autarkic and in 
which there is a state of permanent relational chaos. Individuals are fully self-reliant 
for the provision of necessities for survival. Consequently, the generated level of 
welfare is at the level of pure subsistence. Any additional utility generated through 
interpersonal spillovers from social interaction are purely additional benefits to the 
generically low subsistence levels. 
Stage II: Primitive equilibrium. Within a primitive relational economy there might 
exist conditions that allow the emergence of a stable social interaction pattern. Such a 
stable pattern is only founded on subjective and personal features, not on any objective 
or social conditions. Within this stage we distinguish two sub-stages. 
(II-A) At first there only emerges a stable pattern in which interpersonal spill-
overs are exploited. This first level of stable social interaction facilitates the 
emergence of a moderate level of subjective trust among the matched 
individuals. 
(II-B) Next, the emergence of sufficient subjective trust among the individuals 
that are engaged with each other, supports the introduction of exchange among 
those individuals; the exploitation of interpersonal spillovers is extended into 
the exchange of economic commodities leading to even higher levels of 
utilities. The emergence of exchange is an important step into the development 
of an economy. 
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Stage III: Subjective specialization. After exchange has been established there is the 
possibility for a further deepening of interpersonal trust within the stable relationships 
in the economy. This facilitates the emergence of subjective specialization in which 
individuals based on the demands of their interpersonal relationships specialize their 
economic activities. Hence, within the context of a stable exchange relationship with 
another individual, an individual selects a production plan to optimize his utility level 
based on the resulting consumption plan.  
This process of subjective specialization is similar to the specialization process based 
on inframarginal analysis developed by Yang - as a formalization of the Smith-Young 
development mechanism - within the context of a perfectly competitive price 
mechanism. However, subjective specialization does not take place within the context 
of a functioning price mechanism, but rather within the interpersonal relational setting 
of each individual separately. 
Stage IV: Objective specialization. The emergence of subjectively specialized 
individuals can lead to the recognition of socio-economic roles in the society at large. 
Hence, individuals specializing subjectively on certain skills within the context of their 
individual value-generating relationships, become socially recognized as occupying a 
“profession” that relates to this specific skill-set. Thus, professionals are identified in 
the society as occupying a certain socio-economic role. This corresponds to an 
objectification of the specialization of that individual: the individual assumes in fact an 
objectively defined and socially recognized economic role. 
Subsequently, there emerge social rules related to these socio-economic roles. 
Returning to our illustrative example of a hunter-gatherer society, the engagement of a 
socially recognized “hunter” with a socially recognized “gatherer” in an economically 
beneficial (exchange) relationship thus becomes the foundation for economic develop-
ment. Individuals subsequently specialize in an objective fashion; they now select 
from a given set of socio-economic roles and engage in an objective fashion with other 
individuals in their respective social roles to generate mutual economic benefits.  
It is only within this context of objective specialization that there emerges a social 
division of labor which further development acts as an engine for economic growth - 
described in the context of a market by the Smith-Young mechanism. 
Stage V: Market emergence. We argue that only after the establishment of a social 
division of labor based on the social recognition of certain economic roles, there can 
emerge a functioning market or price mechanism. Besides the social division of labor 
there have to be established other economic institutions. Only after these other 
conditions are met, there might emerge a price mechanism through which further 
economic growth and development is made possible in the form of the Smith-Young 
mechanism based on the extent of the market. 
 
In this paper we only have developed the most basic principles of a descriptive theory. The 
main conclusion is that economic development and growth are closely related to the objective 
development of an extended set of socio-economic roles in a society. These social roles have 
an objectively, public nature and as such should be subject to a purely public economic 
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theoretical analysis or an evolutionary treatment. This is closely related to the conclusion of 
Gilles and Diamantaras (2005). 
Further development of this abstract theory of matching economies is required before 
we can expect a full and working understanding of the five-stage process of market 
development summarized above. This is left to future research. 
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